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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1177 
 ___________ 
 
 JAMES GEORGE DOURIS, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
 UPPER MAKEFIELD TOWNSHIP 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-01469) 
 District Judge:  Honorable R. Barclay Surrick 
 ____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Summary Action Pursuant to Third 
Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
 
March 29, 2012 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed : April 12, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
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PER CURIAM1
 James Douris, a frequent litigant before this 
Court,
 
2
                                                 
1 In light of the Clerk’s order of January 27, 2012, 
this opinion is presented in Courier New 14-point 
monospace font.  
 
2 See Douris v. Middletown Twp., 353 F. App’x 672 (3d 
Cir. 2009) (appeal dismissed as frivolous); Douris v. 
Newtown Borough, No. 07-4427, 2009 WL 90848 (3d Cir. 
Jan. 15, 2009) (affirming denial of in forma pauperis 
status); Douris v. Middletown Twp., 293 F. App’x 130 
(3d Cir. 2008) (affirming denial of in forma pauperis 
status, while remanding for reconsideration of an order 
entered without jurisdiction); Douris v. Huff, 260 F. 
App’x 441 (3d Cir. 2008) (affirming District Court’s 
dismissal of complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(e)(2)(B)); Douris v. Newtown Borough, Inc., 207 F. 
App’x 242 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Douris v. Office of 
the Pa. Att’y Gen., 174 F. App’x 691 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(affirming dismissal of complaint); Douris v. Bucks 
Cnty., 145 F. App’x 735 (3d Cir. 2005) (dismissing 
appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Douris 
v. Genuardi’s Family Mkts., Inc., 132 F. App’x 425 (3d 
Cir. 2005) (affirming grant of summary judgment); 
Douris v. Rendell, 100 F. App’x 126 (3d Cir. 2004) 
(table); Douris v. Dougherty, 90 F. App’x 434 (3d Cir. 
2004) (table); Douris v. Cnty. of Bucks, 85 F. App’x 
870 (3d Cir. 2003) (table).  
 sued Upper Makefield Township for alleged 
violations of the Constitution and federal law.  He 
proceeded pro se and was granted in forma pauperis 
status.  During motions practice, and in support of a 
3 
 
motion for default judgment, Douris submitted a 
document to the District Court that appeared to have 
been modified to show an earlier service date.  Compare 
Pl. Adds to Pl.’s Claim of J. by Default Ex. 1, ECF No. 
13, with Process Receipt, ECF No. 5.  Upper Makefield 
Township asked the District Court to sanction Douris by 
dismissing his complaint, a motion that Douris did not 
meaningfully oppose.  The Court concluded that Douris 
had “made a material misrepresentation” in his 
submissions, and found this “outrageous” action—
otherwise unexplained by Douris—to merit dismissal with 
prejudice.  See Order, ECF No. 17.  In response, Douris 
filed a motion accusing the District Court of being “in 
violation of the law” for not accommodating his 
disabilities (the “July 25 motion”).  The motion was 
denied, and this appeal followed. 
 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291,3
                                                 
3 The District Court dismissed Douris’s complaint by an 
order entered on the civil docket on July 21, 2011.  
The order, which contained reasoning explaining the 
decision to dismiss (albeit through the use of 
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reviewing the District Court’s decision to dismiss the 
complaint as a sanction for abuse of discretion while 
evaluating its factual findings for clear error.4
                                                                                                                                                             
footnotes), did not satisfy the requirements of Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 58, also known as the “separate document” or 
“separate judgment” rule.  To be in compliance with 
Rule 58, an order must substantially “omit[] the 
District Court’s reasons for disposing of the parties’ 
motions as it did.”  Local Union No. 1992 of IBEW v. 
Okonite Co., 358 F.3d 278, 285 (3d Cir. 2004); see also 
LeBoon v. Lancaster Jewish Cmty. Ctr. Ass’n, 503 F.3d 
217, 224 (3d Cir. 2007).  Because the order contained 
substantial reasoning, and was therefore not in 
compliance with Rule 58, the time of its entry was set 
at 150 days after its appearance on the civil docket, 
which we calculate to be Sunday, December 18, 2011.  
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B); Fed. R. App. P. 
4(a)(7)(A)(ii); UAW Local 259 Soc. Sec. Dep’t v. Metro 
Auto Ctr., 501 F.3d 283, 287 (3d Cir. 2007).  Since the 
last day of the period was a Sunday, the order was 
entered the next day: Monday, December 19, 2011.  See 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C); Fed. R. App. P. 
26(a)(1)(C).  Douris was then required to file his 
notice of appeal within thirty days, see Fed. R. App. 
P. 4(a)(1)(A); the District Court docket reflects an 
on-time filing on January 18, 2012.  
 
4 We detect no such error in the District Court’s 
central factual finding: that Douris modified the 
process receipt in support of his motion for default 
judgment. 
 
  In re 
Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1988);  Poulis 
v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 747 F.2d 863, 868 
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(3d Cir. 1984).  Recognizing that dismissal is a 
sanction of last resort, we focus on whether the 
District Court properly balanced the Poulis factors5
 While not invoking Poulis by name, the District 
Court appears to have appropriately weighed relevant 
 in 
deciding to dismiss the complaint.  Hicks v. Feeney, 
850 F.2d 152, 156 (3d Cir. 1988).  “In balancing the 
Poulis factors, we do not have a ‘magic formula’ or 
‘mechanical calculation’ to determine whether a 
District Court abused its discretion in dismissing a 
plaintiff’s case.”  Briscoe v. Klaus, 538 F.3d 252, 263 
(3d Cir. 2008) (citing Mindek v. Rigatti, 964 F.2d 
1369, 1373 (3d Cir. 1992)).  
                                                 
5 These factors are: “(1) the extent of the party’s 
personal responsibility; (2) the prejudice to the 
adversary . . . ; (3) a history of dilatoriness; (4) 
whether the conduct of the party or the attorney was 
willful or in bad faith; (5) the effectiveness of 
sanctions other than dismissal, which entails an 
analysis of alternative sanctions; and (6) the 
meritoriousness of the claim or defense.”  Poulis, 747 
F.2d at 868 (emphasis in original).  “Not all of these 
factors need be met for a district court to find 
dismissal is warranted.”  Hicks, 850 F.3d at 156. 
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factors, addressing the egregiousness of Douris’s 
conduct and his apparent lack of contrition.  As a pro 
se litigant, Douris alone was responsible for the 
content of his submissions.  Further, Douris’s history 
of “frivolous” and “abusive” filings was well known to 
the Court.  See Order n.1 (citing Douris v. Middletown 
Twp., 293 F. App’x 130, 132–33 (3d Cir. 2008)).  Douris 
was given an opportunity to correct the record or 
withdraw his motion,6
 The District Court did not specifically discuss the 
 but did not do so, and failed to 
address the discrepancy observed by the defendant and 
the District Court—a plausible sign of both willfulness 
and bad faith. 
                                                 
6 According to the defendant, Douris was notified by 
mail on April 11, 2011, of his material 
misrepresentation and the possible consequences, and 
was given time to withdraw the material or explain his 
conduct.  See Mot. for Sanctions ¶ 5,ECF No. 16.  The 
defendant had originally pointed out the sanctionable 
conduct to the Court in its response of April 8.  See 
Resp. ¶¶ 1, 3, ECF No. 14.  More than two months 
elapsed between the motion for sanctions and the 
District Court’s decision, with no response from 
Douris. 
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final two relevant Poulis factors: the effectiveness of 
alternative sanctions and the meritoriousness of the 
claim.  Despite this, we do not find reversible error 
under the deferential standard of review that controls.  
See Guyer v. Beard, 907 F.2d 1424, 1429–30 (holding 
that conduct by a litigant can be so “contumacious” 
that a district court need not specifically write about 
each of the Poulis considerations).  With regard to 
alternative sanctions, such as financial penalties, the 
District Court’s options were limited by Douris’s pro 
se and in forma pauperis status.  See Briscoe, 538 F.3d 
at 262–63.  As to the meritoriousness of Douris’s 
complaint, we note his history of frivolous suits.7
All in all, we must conclude that the District 
Court acted within its discretion when it dismissed 
Douris’s complaint based on his willingness to falsify 
  
                                                 
7 We have noted that both the decision to impose 
sanctions and their extent can be guided by “equitable 
considerations,” which may include a history of filing 
frivolous actions.  See Doering v. Union Cnty. Bd. of 
Chosen Freeholders, 857 F.2d 191, 197 n.6 (3d Cir. 
1988).   
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documents at an early stage of litigation and his 
refusal to withdraw the misrepresentation.  “[I]t is 
arguable that a litigant who defrauds the court should 
not be permitted to continue to press his case [in 
certain circumstances].”  Allen v. Chi. Transit Auth., 
317 F.3d 696, 703 (7th Cir. 2003) (Posner, J.).8
 In sum, finding no substantial question to be 
presented by this appeal, we will summarily affirm.  
United States v. Rhines, 640 F.3d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(per curiam); see also 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; IOP 10.6.
  We 
further conclude that the District Court correctly 
denied Douris’s July 25 motion, which had requested no 
easily discernible relief; and while Douris 
demonstrated that various District Court documents were 
sent to the wrong address, he does not appear to have 
been prejudiced by this error. 
                                                 
8 See also Garcia v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co. of Am., 569 
F.3d 1174, 1182 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]he affirmative 
submission of false evidence is, at minimum, akin to a 
fraud on the court, which other courts have found may 
justify the sanction of dismissal.” (citing Allen)). 
